Letters to the Editor

Re: Reduction in Psychiatry
Dear Editor:
Dr Ian Gold's 1 interesting statements and arguments in relation to (neurobiological) reductionism in psychiatry require further discussion, as some of them are problematic and countered by previous work. 2, 3 The statement: "It is a near universal belief among psychiatrists that the future of psychiatric theory and treatment lies in a reductionist research program" 1, p 506 is not evidence-based, as implied in the related editorial by Dr Paul Grof, 4 nor is it conceptually sound, as it is unclear what is meant by the term near-universality, which may be untestable. As such, it risks incorrectly and harmfully labelling psychiatrists as intellectually naive.
The argument: "if mental illness is a form of brain pathology, then one ought to treat the illness by ministering to the brain" 1, p 507 commits a fallacy, as even if mental illness is (only) a form of brain pathology, ministering to the brain-presumably by so-called biological means such as medications, rather than by psychosocial means such as psychotherapy-may not be more, or even as, effective than psychosocial interventions for mental illness. Indeed, the brain is now known to be plastic, in response to both psychotherapy and other learning experiences. 5 The statement: "metaphysics has no consequences for the development of science" 1, p 509 is controversial if not false, as scholars of science have demonstrated that metaphysics facilitates if not enables theoretical development in science. 6 The implied identification: "facts about the stuff that objects are made of" 1, p 509 with metaphysics misconstrues metaphysics, which is widely agreed to consist of theories (rather than facts) about the stuff that objects are made of; further, metaphysics has been argued to consist of untestable theories, which, if modified to be tested, are argued to move from the realm of metaphysical theories to the realm of scientific theories. 7 The argument: "the hypothesis that psychiatry will be reduced to biology is itself an empirical hypothesis; it cannot be decided by metaphysical arguments," 1, p 509 and the related statement: "Metaphysical (or other) arguments about what has to be the case are entirely at odds with general scientific method," 1, p 511 ignore an argument from philosophy of science that reductionism and similar doctrines may be neither metaphysical nor empirical, but rather epistemological, and as such may not postulate what has to be the case and may be fully compatible with, if not fundamental to, general scientific method. 
Dear Editor: 2-3 Although we agree that "inclusion of a placebo arm would have meant a departure from the principle of pragmatism," 1, p 134 the existing evidence did not justify such a purely pragmatic trial. Comparing active treatments without a placebo group is appropriate when at least one of the treatments has established benefits, but according to the metaanalyses cited, ADs have little or no benefit compared with placebo for mild to moderate depression. This has particular implications for STAR*D, which included many mildly depressed patients.
We recognize that the findings of the meta-analyses are controversial. Even if these studies are set aside, however, it remains that the superiority of ADs over placebo has not been established in depressed patients who are treated not in standard RCTs but in the real-world settings of STAR*D. The absence of a placebo group may improve STAR*D's generalizability to clinical practice, but the considerable cost is that the trial provides little information about the effectiveness of the treatments in this context. Indeed, given the striking result that no differences were found between medications with completely different mechanisms of action, it is likely that nonspecific factors-such as the placebo effect and the experience of being in treatment-were much more important than the specific treatments themselves. Further, as depression is typically an episodic illness that remits on its own within a year, 4 and STAR*D lasted about a year for patients who progressed to the end of the fourth treatment level, it is difficult to interpret the cumulative 67% remission rate in patients who remained in the study. The meaning of this figure becomes even less clear when one considers that many patients dropped out of the study or relapsed during the 12-month naturalistic follow-up.
The authors conclude that the results of STAR*D "have shed important light on the effectiveness of current treatment strategies for patients with depression." 1, p 134 However, we would argue that because of the absence of a placebo group, STAR*D obscures more than it illuminates. In fact, the very decision not to include a placebo group implies that the benefits of ADs are better established than current evidence suggests. 
Re: The Absence of a Placebo Group Is a Serious Limitation of the STAR*D Trial
We would like to thank Dr Gorman and Dr Abi-Jaoude for their letter. It provides us with an important opportunity to clarify the distinction between pragmatic and explanatory trials. Explanatory trials are designed to test whether a specific treatment has added benefit over placebo in a homogenous patient population. In contrast, pragmatic trials are designed to test how a heterogeneous, more typical patient population responds to interventions under a closer approximation of the conditions found in clinical practice, that is, in the real world.
In any trial design there are tradeoffs and STAR*D's pragmatic design, omitting a placebo arm, did not allow authors to ask the question of whether it was a failed trial; that is, were all treatments equally effective or equally ineffective. However, this does not interfere with our ability to interpret the results. STAR*D provides clinically relevant benchmarks for treatment response at each level in addition to a host of important secondary outcomes. Dr Gorman and Dr Abi-Jaoude state that
